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Metaphor aptness and conventionality: A processing fluency account
Paul H. Thibodeau
Stanford University

Frank H. Durgin
Swarthmore College

Conventionality and aptness are two dimensions of metaphorical sentences thought to play an important
role in determining how quick and easy it is to process a metaphor. Conventionality refers to the
familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness refers to the degree to which a metaphor vehicle captures
important features of a metaphor topic. In recent years it has become clear that operationalizing these two
constructs is not as simple as asking naïve raters for subjective judgments. It has been found that ratings
of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated, which has led some researchers to pursue alternative
methods for measuring the constructs. Here four experiments explored the underlying reasons for the
high correlation in ratings of aptness and conventionality and raise doubt about the construct validity of
various methods for measuring the two dimensions. Manipulation of the processing fluency of a
metaphorical sentence by means of familiarization to similar senses of the metaphor (in vivo
conventionalization) was found to influence ratings of the sentence’s aptness. This misattribution may
help explain why subjective ratings of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated. Other reasons to
question the construct validity of conventionality and aptness measures are observed: For instance,
conventionality is shown to be context dependent and thus not attributable to a metaphor vehicle alone,
and ratings of aptness reflect salient non-mapping features as well as mapped ones.

Most people agree that the metaphor Memory is a warehouse is easier to understand than the metaphor A
fisherman is a spider. But is this because the former is more familiar than the latter or because the metaphor
vehicle warehouse captures the important features of memory better than the metaphor vehicle spider captures
the important features of a fisherman?
Recent work in the metaphor processing literature has identified these two dimensions of metaphorical
sentences – conventionality and aptness – as candidates for explaining variation in metaphor processing
fluency, the speed and ease with which people process a metaphor (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Clement &
Gentner, 1991; Glucksberg, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b; Jones & Estes, 2005, 2006).
Conventionality reflects the familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness reflects the degree to which a metaphor
vehicle captures important features of a metaphor topic.
It has been argued that gaining a better understanding of how conventionality and aptness impact metaphor
processing fluency will yield insight into the mechanisms that underlie metaphor processing. Two alternative
models of metaphor processing have been proposed. One relies on a categorization-based mechanism
(Glucksberg, 2001, 2008; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg,
McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997; Honeck, Kibler, & Firment, 1987; Kennedy, 1990). On this view, a metaphor
vehicle is the prototypical member of a dynamically created category and a metaphorical sentence serves to
identify the metaphor topic as a member of this category. For instance, in the example above, warehouse would
be considered the prototypical member of the category of “vast but bounded spaces for storage,” and memory
would be considered an exemplar of this category. Variance in the speed and ease with which people process a
metaphor, according to this approach, is related to the ease with which this taxonomic relationship can be
established. That is, if memory is already thought of as a vast but bounded space for storage, then it will be
considered highly apt and it will be a good fit to the warehouse category. As a result, it will be quick and easy
to process.
An alternative model proposes that the mechanisms that underlie metaphor comprehension differ depending
on the familiarity of the metaphor. This is the career of metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). On this
view, novel and conventional metaphors are processed as category assertions (as detailed above), but novel
metaphors require a relatively more intensive comparison-based process like structure mapping (Clement &
Gentner, 1991; Gentner, 1982, 1983; Gentner, Bowdel, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001; Gentner & Wolff, 1997;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Indurkhya, 1987; Kittay & Lehrer, 1981; Murphy, 1996; Verbrugge & McCarrell,
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1977). The theory behind this view is that when people encounter a completely novel metaphor like A fisherman
is a spider, they have to map the relational structure of spider onto that of a fisherman to understand the
sentence. In this case, one might liken a patient spider to an enduring fisherman and a spider’s net to a
fisherman’s line to generate a mental image of the sentence. On the other hand, when people encounter a highly
conventional metaphor like Memory is a warehouse they may be able to directly retrieve an interpretation from
memory.
Recent experimental evidence suggests that both dimensions are important determinants of the processing
fluency of a metaphor. Several studies have found that the more conventional a metaphor, the faster people
process it (Blank, 1988; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Giora, 1997) while other studies have found that the more
apt a metaphor, the faster people process it (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999; Chiappe,
Kennedy, & Chiappe, 2003; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999; Jones & Estes, 2005, 2006).
However, in recent years, it has become clear that operationalizing the two constructs may not be as easy as
asking naïve raters for subjective ratings. For instance, Jones and Estes (2006) found that subjective ratings of
conventionality and aptness are highly correlated and possibly confounded. This finding was surprising because
it had been thought that the two constructs were orthogonal – a metaphor need not be conventional to be apt
(e.g., Beavers are lumberjacks); similarly, a metaphor need not be apt to be conventional (e.g., The clue is a red
herring).
Assuming that the conventionality and aptness of a given set of metaphors is not inherently related, there are
several reasons why ratings of the two constructs could become so highly correlated. Raters could misattribute a
metaphor’s aptness for its conventionality. If this were the case, then ratings of aptness would actually reflect
the conventionality of a metaphor. Alternatively, raters could misattribute a metaphor’s conventionality for its
aptness, in which case ratings of conventionality would actually reflect the aptness of a metaphor. Or, finally,
raters could misattribute some other variable to ratings of both constructs. If this were the case, then ratings of
aptness and conventionality would at least partially reflect some other mediating variable.
Jones and Estes (2006) take the position that ratings of conventionality actually reflect the aptness of a
metaphor. They attempt to resolve this confound by utilizing an alternative method for operationalizing
conventionality (which we call metaphor-vehicle conventionality in contrast to metaphor-sentence
conventionality). This method involves yoking the conventionality of a metaphor to a metaphor vehicle: for
instance, according to this approach, all blueprint metaphors (e.g., A syllabus is a blueprint; A game-plan is a
blueprint) are equally conventional.
Metaphor-vehicle conventionality is measured in two steps: First, a single figurative property that is
commonly elicited by the given metaphor vehicle is identified. For instance, blueprint metaphors often highlight
some notion of “planning,” so we might identify the property “provides a plan” with the metaphor vehicle
blueprint. Second, raters judge the degree to which this property is associated with the metaphor vehicle by
rating “how conventional it is to use the concept (e.g., BLUEPRINT) to represent the given property (e.g.,
provides a plan)” (p. 23). Jones and Estes find that this method of operationalizing conventionality yields
ratings that are not correlated with ratings of aptness, thus successfully differentiating the two constructs.
However, a potential drawback of this approach, as we detail in Experiments 1 and 2, is that these ratings may
not reflect a notion of familiarity. Adopting the metaphor-vehicle conventionality approach commits us to the
view that the metaphor A monkey is a blueprint is just as conventional as A syllabus is a blueprint, which does
not seem true.
In this paper, we take a close look at why ratings of aptness and metaphor-conventionality are so highly
related and explore whether the standard and alternative methods for measuring the constructs are valid and
reliable. In Experiment 1, we replicate Jones and Estes (2006) finding that subjective ratings of aptness and
conventionality are highly correlated and evaluate the various methods for operationalizing conventionality.
Unlike Jones and Estes (2006), we do not argue that conventionality ratings are aptness ratings in disguise.
Instead, we take the position that people’s metacognitive awareness of the processing fluency of the metaphors
that they rate bleeds into their judgments of both constructs. Previous work by Jacoby and others has found that
people tend to misattribute a general sense of processing fluency to abstract target dimensions that they are
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trying to rate (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Jacoby & Whitehouse,
1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). That is, raters may unwittingly rate the metaphor A memory is a warehouse high
in conventionality and aptness not because the metaphor is especially familiar to them or because warehouse is
a particularly good description of memory, but, in part, because the sentence is easy to process. If this is indeed
what is going on then it would be problematic to use these ratings to predict reading time (RT) data, since RTs
are a direct measure of processing fluency.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we set out to evaluate two methods of operationalizing the conventionality of metaphors:
metaphor-sentence conventionality and metaphor-vehicle-conventionality. Metaphor-sentence conventionality
is measured by directly rating metaphorical sentences for their familiarity whereas metaphor-vehicle
conventionality involves measuring the rated association strength between a figurative property and a metaphor
vehicle.
First, we look at whether these methods yield conventionality ratings that are correlated with ratings of
aptness. Jones and Estes (2006) find that metaphor-sentence conventionality ratings are highly correlated with
and possibly confounded by aptness ratings but that metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings are uncorrelated
with aptness ratings.
Second, we compare both types of conventionality ratings to frequency counts of the metaphorical sentences
in a corpus. Since the conventionality construct is intended to measure familiarity, we should expect to find a
relationship between the actual prevalence of a given metaphor and its rated conventionality. That is, for either
method of conventionality ratings to have construct validity, it should reflect the actual pervasiveness of the
metaphor. Indeed, we believe that pursuing a method for generating conventionality measurements from a
corpus of natural language would be a worthwhile future endeavor. This would provide a more objective means
of valuing metaphors along this dimension. However, the approach that we adopt here is only a first step in this
direction.
Method
Participants. Seventy-two Swarthmore College undergraduates participated in the experiment in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement. All were native English speakers.
Materials and design. In the analyses below, we will compare data collected by Jones and Estes (2006) to
data that we gather here. We will use three pieces of data from the Jones and Estes data set: reported metaphorvehicle conventionality ratings, reported aptness ratings, and metaphor reading time data, which were
graciously provided to us by Jones and Estes. We will gather two additional pieces of data here: metaphorsentence conventionality ratings and corpus frequency counts.
All of the data mentioned above was collected on the same set of 128 metaphoric sentences from Jones and
Estes (2006). The stimulus set was modified from a sample of 100 metaphors that had been used previously for
similar experiments (e.g., Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark, 1998; McGlone, 1996; McGlone & Manfredi,
2001). Jones and Estes took the original list of 100 metaphors as a high-apt usage of the 100 metaphor vehicles.
They created a corresponding low-quality version for each metaphor by substituting a less appropriate topic for
the original topic. For instance, A rooster is an alarm clock would be the original (reasonably apt) usage of the
alarm clock vehicle and A robin is an alarm clock would be the low-quality substitution. After gathering
aptness ratings and metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings for each of the 200 sentences, Jones and Estes
selected 64 pairs of original and modified statements to be included in the final set of 128 metaphors. This
yielded 32 metaphoric sentences in each of the four quadrants of a two-by-two table: high-apt and highconventional, high-apt and low-conventional, low-apt and high-conventional, and low-apt and lowconventional. We emphasize that the “low-apt” stimuli were created with the intention of inducing low ratings
of aptness, whereas (as we will argue below) it is probably best to classify these, a-theoretically, as “modified”
variants of the original metaphor sentences.
To get an approximate sense of how frequently each of these 128 sentences are used in natural discourse we
used the Google search engine to generate frequency counts for each of the sentences. While we can gain a
In press (2011), Metaphor and Symbol
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general sense of frequency from using the Google search engine, it should be noted that there are drawbacks to
using Google as a corpus (e.g., Kilgarriff & Grefenstette, 2003).
To gather metaphor-conventionality ratings, we asked each participant to directly judge the conventionality of
a subset of 32 metaphoric sentences from the set of 128 (eight from each quadrant of the two-by-two table).
Ratings were made on a seven-point Likert scale. The instructions read as follows:
For this section of the survey, you will be asked to judge the conventionality (commonness) of a variety of
simple metaphoric sentences. Expressions can vary in conventionality with respect to any idea that they are
intended to communicate. For example, consider the following two descriptions of the mind: a
conventional one, The mind is a computer, and an unconventional one, The mind is a food processor. Both
of these metaphors make sense and convey a similar idea: Information can be stored and processed and
digested and swallowed. Nonetheless, the first metaphor, The mind is a computer, is clearly more common
or conventional than the second one, The mind is a food processor.

Procedure. Because the metaphor-conventionality ratings task was untimed, participants were tested in
groups in a classroom. Ratings were made on paper surveys. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Results and Discussion
With regard to the metaphor-conventionality ratings, we computed a mean metaphor-conventionality score
for each of the 128 sentences in the set. The distribution of the mean conventionality ratings ranged from 1.6 to
7.0. The overall mean rating was 4.27 and the standard deviation was 1.47. We then correlated these
conventionality scores with aptness ratings, vehicle-conventionality ratings, reading time data, and frequency
counts of the same sentences.
With regard to the Google-generated frequency counts, we found that the distribution of frequency counts
ranged from 1 to 4,420,000. The mean frequency was 89,729 (the median was 2) and the standard deviation was
502,654. Because the distribution was highly skewed, we log-transformed the frequency counts before
comparing them with conventionality or aptness ratings.
Metaphor-sentence conventionality and aptness. Our findings confirmed those of Jones and Estes (2006):
metaphor-sentence conventionality ratings and aptness ratings are highly correlated, r = .87, t[126] = 20.11, p <
.001 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Aptness ratings (as reported by Jones and Estes, 2006) are compared with two methods for rating
conventionality. On the left, raters judge the conventionality of metaphoric sentences as a whole. On the right, raters
judge the conventionality of metaphor vehicles alone.
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This could be because, as Jones and Estes (2006) argue, ratings of metaphor-conventionality actually reflect
variation in aptness. However, this could also be because when people rate metaphoric sentences for aptness or
conventionality their overall sense of how easy the metaphor is to process bleeds into their judgment.
Metaphor-sentence and metaphor-vehicle conventionality. To decouple aptness and conventionality
ratings, Jones and Estes (2006) relied on ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality rather than metaphorsentence conventionality. These ratings have the advantage of being uncorrelated with ratings of aptness. As a
result, it should not be surprising to find that this measure of metaphor-vehicle conventionality is also
uncorrelated with ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality, r = .07 (t[126] = .74, p = ns). However, this
might also signal a problem with the construct of metaphor-vehicle conventionality.
Conventionality and observed frequency. We found a high correlation between ratings of metaphorsentence conventionality and measured frequency, r = .37, t[126] = 4.52, p < .001, and a low correlation
between metaphor-vehicle conventionality and measured frequency, r = .035, t[126] = 4.52, p = ns. This
suggests that ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality are related to the actual prevalence of the sentences
used in the study but that ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality are not. Since metaphor-sentence
conventionality and aptness ratings are highly correlated, it is not surprising that aptness ratings are also highly
correlated with this measure of observed frequency, r = .41, t[126] = 5.07, p < .001. Although it may be that
frequency of use is a result of aptness, it is equally likely that ratings of aptness are contaminated by actual
familiarity (i.e., metaphor-sentence conventionality).
RT and Observed Frequency. Log frequency counts (actual conventionality) were highly correlated with
how quickly and easily people are able to comprehend metaphors, r = -0.249, t(126) = 2.89, p < .01. Although it
is possible that ease of processing also predicts metaphor frequency, the implication that metaphor frequency
predicts processing speed provides additional evidence for the value of metaphor-sentence conventionality as a
theoretical construct.
Interim conclusions. When analyzed at the sentence level, ratings of metaphor-sentence conventionality and
of aptness are indeed highly correlated. But both measures are also highly correlated with the observed
frequency of occurrence of the relevant sentences in language databases, which in turn strongly predicts
sentence RTs. Given the relationship with observed frequencies in the language, the claim that raters are
successful at rating metaphor aptness when asked to so, but fail to accurately judge metaphor conventionality
seems poorly supported.
Conversely, although using metaphor-vehicle conventionality ratings instead of metaphor-sentence
conventionality ratings successfully decouples ratings of the two dimensions, this alternative method of defining
conventionality does not exhibit construct validity: This may be because the metaphoric sense of alarm clock
that applies to rooster is not really the same sense that applies to robin (e.g., a rooster is regarded as reliable,
loud, and connected to a fixed timer – sunrise – whereas none of these properties are associated with a robin.)
We suggest that ratings of metaphor-vehicle conventionality do not predict the interpretability of metaphoric
sentences because not all metaphoric senses that employ the same nominal metaphor vehicle are equally
familiar (i.e., the specific metaphor sense that is evoked by a particular topic can vary quite a bit).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 we found that observed sentence frequency was correlated with reading time. Here we test
whether the direct manipulation of familiarity with a specific metaphor sense also affects comprehension time.
In particular, we contrasted the effects of familiarization when applied to the same sense or a different sense of
a specific metaphor vehicle.
We adapted a paradigm designed by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) called “in-vitro conventionalization.”
Bowdle and Gentner found that they could facilitate the processing of a metaphoric sentence by first exposing
people to examples of similar metaphors (i.e., metaphors that use the same vehicle and instantiate a similar
meaning as the target sentence). For instance, if the target sentence is Education is a lantern, then the priming
sentences might read A mentor is a lantern and An encyclopedia is a lantern. Because the prime sentences and
the target sentence all highlight the power of lanterns to metaphorically light the darkness of ignorance, the
target metaphor becomes easier to understand. At the same time, Bowdle and Gentner found that literal prime
In press (2011), Metaphor and Symbol
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sentences like A camp light is a lantern or A torch is a lantern did not facilitate the processing of a related target
metaphoric sentence, thereby ruling out the possibility that the facilitation effect was driven by lexical priming.
To clarify the importance of priming the specific metaphoric sense, we include here another class of prime:
alternative-sense primes. Whereas same-sense metaphor primes are metaphoric sentences that use a target
sentence’s vehicle to instantiate a similar meaning as the target sentence, alternative-sense primes are
metaphoric sentences that use a target sentence’s vehicle to instantiate a meaning that is dissimilar to that of the
target sentence. For example, an alternative-sense sentence for lantern could evoke the concept of a signaling
device as in Education is a lantern or A flag is a lantern.
If, as we argue, the conventionality of a metaphor is specific to its contextual sense, as defined by its
relationship to the topic of the sentence, then same-sense metaphor primes alone should facilitate the processing
of related target sentences.
Method
Participants. Eighty Swarthmore College and Stanford University undergraduates participated in the
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement or pay. All were native English speakers. Data from
nine participants was not included in the analysis because these participants either did not follow instructions or
did not complete the experiment.
Materials and Design. The experiment consisted of two phases: a priming phase and a test phase. Sentences
for the test phase were taken from the appendix of Jones and Estes (2006) – one sentence for each of the 64
metaphor vehicles. For each metaphor vehicle, we randomly chose whether to select the Original or the
Modified version of the sentence; however, we made sure to select 32 Original and 32 Modified sentences. We
then randomly assigned 16 of the 64 sentences to be “fillers” (8 were Original and 8 were Modified versions)
and the remaining 48 sentences to be “target” sentences.
Sentences for the priming phase were created by the authors. Each target sentence (e.g., Education is a
lantern) was the basis for three types of prime sentences: same-sense, in which a similar metaphoric mapping
was instantiated (e.g., A mentor is a lantern); alternative-sense, (e.g., A flag is a lantern); and literal-sense (e.g.,
A camp light is a lantern). Two sentences of each type were created for each target sentence for a total of 288
prime sentences (see the appendix for the complete stimulus set). In our analyses below, we compare RTs for
target sentences (e.g., Education is a lantern) as a function of the three different types of priming conditions as
well as an unprimed condition.
Four versions of the experiment were created. In each case the test phase consisted of the same 48 test
sentences (plus 16 fillers) and the prime phase consisted of 24 same-sense primes (for 12 of the target
sentences), 24 alternative-sense primes (for another 12 of the target sentences), and 24 literal primes (for
another 12 of the target sentences). In each version there were also 12 target sentences that were not primed.
Between participants, each target sentence was presented in each prime context.
The participants’ task in the priming phase of the experiment was to rate the metaphoricity – the degree to
which the sentences were metaphorical – of the sentences on a scale from 1 to 5. We chose this task to ensure
that participants would carefully read the prime sentences.
The participants’ task in the test phase of the experiment was modeled on Jones and Estes (2006). Participants
were asked to read and think of an interpretation of the given sentence. Before each sentence appeared, a
‘******’ was presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds. When it disappeared, a target sentence took its
place. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar once they had an interpretation in mind. When they
pressed the spacebar, they were prompted to type in their interpretation.
The experiment was implemented in Java. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given oral
and written instructions about the nature of the experiment. The oral instructions emphasized speed and
accuracy as well as the logistics of the computer program. The written instructions explained the task. They
read as follows:
On the screens that follow, please read each sentence, think about what it means, and judge how
metaphorical it is. Indicate a rating from 1 (not metaphorical) to 5 (very metaphorical) by typing the
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number at the top of the keyboard. Then press spacebar to record your answer and move on to the next
sentence.

After the participants completed the prime phase, the program explained the second half of the experiment.
These instructions read as follows:
In this part of the experiment, you will again read sentences one at a time; however, this time all of the
sentences will be metaphorical. Your task is to carefully read the sentence and decide what it means.
When you have an interpretation in mind, press the spacebar and then type your interpretation into the
textbox that appears. After you write your interpretation, press the return (enter) key and prepare for the
next sentence.

Procedure. Participants were tested in individual testing rooms. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes.
The order of the sentences was randomized in both the study and test phase of the experiment. However, the
order of the test phase was set so that the 16 filler sentences were the first 16 sentences of the test phase. They
were used to acclimate the participant to the test phase of the experiment. We did not analyze data collected on
the filler sentences.
Results and Discussion
Metaphoricity ratings. In designing the study, we were not interested in the metaphoricity ratings of the
prime sentences per se; however, results from this task can be analyzed to ensure that the metaphoric primes
(same-sense and alternative-sense) were considered more metaphoric than the literal primes. To test this, we fit
a linear mixed-effects regression model with random intercepts for subjects and items (Baayen, Davidson, &
Bates, 2008). T-tests on the coefficients from the model revealed that literal primes (mean = 1.39, sd = .79)
were rated as significantly less metaphoric than the alternative-sense primes (mean = 3.17, sd = 1.37; t = 57.9, p
< .001) and the same-sense primes (mean = 3.49, sd = 1.30; t = 48.8, p < .001). It also revealed that same-sense
primes were judged as slightly more metaphoric than alternative sense primes, t = 9.02, p < .01.

Figure 2. Mean RTs for target sentences grouped by prime-type.
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Reading times (RTs). Extreme reading times were trimmed so that response times below 50 ms (button-press
errors) were removed, as were response times above 15,000 ms. Average reading times as a function of Priming
Condition are shown separately for Original and for Modified metaphoric sentences in Figure 2.
We conducted the statistical analyses of the RT data with log-transformed RTs to correct for skewness in the
data. The linear mixed-effects regression model found that participants were significantly faster to read target
sentences when they were preceded by same-sense metaphor primes than when they were preceded by
alternative-sense metaphor primes (t = 2.29, p < .05), literal primes (t = 2.15, p < .05), or no prime (t = 2.93, p <
.01). Although Original metaphoric sentences were comprehended much more rapidly than Modified
metaphoric sentences (t = 4.73, p < .001), this factor did not interact with prime condition. Adding prime
metaphoricity to the model as a covariate did not alter the reliability of the various effects.
These findings replicate and extend those of Bowdle and Gentner (2005). On the one hand, we have
confirmed that processing one metaphoric sentence can lead to speeded processing of another sentence that
employs the same metaphor vehicle. This replicates the observation that the experimental manipulation of
familiarity with a specific metaphor renders similar metaphors easier to understand. However, because we also
tested alternative-sense primes, we have additionally shown that simply sharing a metaphor vehicle is not
enough to facilitate the processing of a target sentence. The prime and target metaphors must also instantiate a
similar meaning.
Experiment 3
Given that ratings of aptness were correlated with actual sentence frequency in Experiment 1, it is natural to
ask whether the priming manipulation of Experiment 2 also has an effect on ratings of aptness. According to the
definition of the construct, aptness reflects the degree to which the metaphor vehicle of a sentence captures
important features of the metaphor topic. However, if ratings of aptness are more holistic and take into account
ease of processing, then the same manipulation that affected comprehension time should affect ratings of
aptness. That is, priming a metaphoric sense seems likely to influence ratings of aptness. To test this we
repeated Experiment 2, but substituted ratings of aptness for the comprehension time measure.
Method
Participants. Sixty-two Swarthmore College and Stanford University undergraduates participated in the
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement or pay. All were native English speakers.
Materials and Design. The materials used in this experiment were identical to those in used in Experiment 2
and the design was similar to that of Experiment 2, except that the participant’s task in the test phase of the
experiment was to generate aptness ratings for the target sentences. Following prior research, aptness was
defined as “the extent to which the statement captures important features of the topic” (Chiappe et al., 2003, p.
97) and participants were asked to indicate an aptness rating from 1 (not apt at all) to 7 (very apt).
Procedure. Because the task was untimed, participants were tested in groups in a computer classroom. The
session lasted approximately 30 minutes. The order of the sentences was randomized in both the study and test
phase of the experiment as in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Metaphoricity ratings. As in the analysis of Experiment 2, the metaphoricity rating task was designed to
ensure that participants closely read the primes. As a result, we were not particularly interested in the results of
this aspect of the experiment; however, evaluating these data affords an opportunity to ensure that the
metaphoric primes were considered more metaphoric than the literal primes. To test this, we fit a linear mixedeffects regression model with random intercepts for subjects and items. The model confirmed that the
alternative-sense metaphor primes (mean = 3.36, sd = 1.37, t = 44.38, p < .001) and same-sense metaphor
primes (mean = 3.69, sd = 1.26, t = 52.49, p < .001) were judged more metaphorical than the literal primes
(mean = 1.41, sd = .79). Additionally, as in Experiment 2, the same-sense primes were rated as significantly
more metaphoric than the mix primes (t = 6.4, p < .01).

In press (2011), Metaphor and Symbol

Metaphor Aptness and Conventionality

9

Figure 3. Mean aptness rating for target sentences grouped by prime-type.

Aptness ratings. To analyze the results from the aptness rating task, we fit a linear mixed-effects regression
model with random intercepts for subjects and items. We found that participants rated target sentences
significantly higher in aptness when they were preceded by same-sense metaphor primes (mean = 4.43, sd =
1.95) than when they were preceded by alternative-sense metaphor primes (mean = 4.04, sd = 2.06; t = 4.92, p <
.001) or literal primes (mean = 4.20, sd = 2.07; t = 3.00, p < .01). Although same-sense priming did not reliably
increase aptness ratings relative to the un-primed condition overall (mean = 4.33, sd = 2.03; t = 1.51, p = ns),
alternative-sense primes reliably reduced aptness ratings for target sentences compared to the un-primed
condition, t = 3.41, p < .01. Thus, aptness ratings for metaphoric sentences are affected by experimental
manipulations, such as priming, that are irrelevant to the theoretical construct of aptness.
As can be seen in Figure 3, aptness ratings were much higher for the Original metaphor sentences than for the
Modified set, but the pattern of priming effects is similar for both. However, whereas the same-sense primed
metaphors showed no overall increase in aptness compared to unprimed metaphors, within the Modified
metaphors the contrast between unprimed sentences and those primed with same-sense metaphors was
marginally reliable, t = 1.87, p = .0621. Including prime metaphoricity in the model did not alter the statistical
conclusions.
The principal findings of the present experiment were that (1) priming with the same metaphoric sense led to
an increase in rated aptness relative to priming with a literal sense, whereas (2) priming an alternative sense of a
metaphor vehicle led to a reduction in rated aptness relative to the unprimed condition. Whereas we had
predicted that processing fluency would increase ratings of aptness, the finding that priming an alternative sense
reduced ratings of aptness implicates the idea that aptness ratings may reflect failures of correspondence as well
as successes.
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Experiment 4
Aptness nominally refers to the extent to which the metaphor vehicle captures important aspects of the topic.
Thus, ratings of aptness are intended to measure the degree to which salient features of the metaphor vehicle are
appropriate descriptions of the metaphor topic. Salient features of the metaphor vehicle that are irrelevant to the
metaphor are outside the purview of the construct. Yet in Experiment 3 it was observed that participants
reduced their aptness ratings when they had recently been exposed to an alternative sense of the target
metaphor.
In this experiment, we asked raters to list salient properties of metaphor vehicles in the stimulus sentences,
noting which ones were applicable to the metaphor topic and which ones were not. If ratings of aptness only
reflect the presence of positive feature overlap, then a model that uses two predictors – one for positive feature
counts and one for negative feature counts – should be no better than a model with only one predictor – for
positive feature counts. However, if ratings of aptness reflect a more holistic consideration of the metaphorical
sentence, then we might expect a model that includes a predictor for negative feature counts to be better than a
model with only one predictor for positive feature counts.
Method
Participants. We recruited sixty-five Swarthmore College undergraduates, all of whom were native English
speakers, to contribute data in exchange for course credit.
Materials and Design. They were presented with 128 metaphoric sentences (all taken from Jones and Estes,
2006) and instructed to list both salient properties of the vehicle that applied to the topic as well as salient
properties of the vehicle that did not. The instructions read as follows:
In the following pages, you will read short metaphoric sentences and you will be asked to list properties
(if any) of the metaphor that capture important features of the subject of the sentence. Where appropriate,
you should also list salient characteristics of the metaphor that seem inappropriate for the subject.
For example, for the metaphor My lawyer is a shark, you might list aggressive, dangerous, ruthless
(cold-blooded), and tenacious as properties of sharks that capture important features of the subject
(lawyer). You should not list such properties as “is a vertebrate” even though both lawyers and sharks are
vertebrates. For “miracle”, as in “That I passed that test was a miracle.” You might list unlikely,
surprising and fortunate. There may also be cases where only one property seems to matter, such as “His
stubble was sandpaper.” Where “rough” seems to be the intended property. Conversely, if a metaphoric
sentence seems not to have any appropriate properties, but implies an inappropriate one, such as the
sentence “His spectacles were sandpaper”, you would list “rough” under the second column of
“inappropriate implied properties.”

Procedure. Because the task was untimed, participants were tested in groups in a classroom. The rating task
was done on paper surveys. The session lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Results and Discussion
For each of the 128 items, the average number of positive listed features and negative listed features was
computed. On average, people listed 1.71 (sd = 0.788) positive features and 1.29 (sd = 0.58) negative features
for each sentence. We then correlated average feature lists with reported aptness ratings and fit linear mixedeffects models to the data. As expected, positive features were positively correlated with published ratings of
aptness (r = 0.43, t[126] = 5.30, p < .001); however, interestingly, negative features were also strongly
correlated with published ratings of aptness (r = -0.31, t[126] = -3.65, p < .001). Further, a model including
predictors for both applicable and inapplicable feature counts explained more variance than a model that
included a predictor only for applicable feature counts, χ2[1] = 2282.8, p < .001. In other words, aptness ratings
appear to reflect both the presence of salient applicable features and the presence of salient inapplicable
features.
For the 64 Original metaphor sentences used by Jones and Estes (2006), the mean numbers of positive and
negative features were 1.79 and 1.27, respectively (a ratio of 1.4:1). For the 64 Modified metaphor stimuli they
developed, the two means were 1.62 and 1.34, respectively (a ratio of 1.2:1). Thus, the stimulus set that was
developed by Jones and Estes (2006) to make a theoretical argument about aptness may have differed in rated
aptness partly as a result of differences that are not relevant to the theoretical construct of aptness. That is, the
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Modified metaphor sentences had a greater number of salient metaphor features that failed to map onto the topic
than did the Original sentences, t[63] = 2.56, p < .05, while having fewer salient metaphor features that
successfully mapped onto the topic, t[63] = 4.20, p < .001. This observation casts reasonable doubt on the
theoretical sufficiency of ratings of aptness as an explanatory variable in scientific theories of metaphor
processing. Ratings of aptness are indeed sensitive to variables that predict comprehension, but it is not clear
that all of those variables have much to do with the theoretical construct of aptness. Moreover, we note that
rather than listing a single salient feature (as per the method of generating metaphor-vehicle conventionality
ratings), the mean number of salient features listed by our participants for each metaphor sentence was 3.
We do not suggest that this feature listing method directly reflects the calculation that participants make when
rating the metaphoric sentences for aptness. Rather, we use this data to make the point that participants seem to
be making a more holistic judgment about the interpretability of the metaphor at hand when they are judging
aptness and that they may be considering more than one aspect of the vehicle.
General Discussion
In this paper, we have found reason to question previous assumptions and methods for operationalizing
conventionality and aptness. With regard to conventionality, we have argued that the construct cannot be
defined for vehicles independent of topics. Just because A syllabus is a blueprint is a conventional metaphor
does not mean that all metaphors that employ blueprint as a metaphor vehicle are equally conventional. We
speculate that using corpus-based frequency counts could provide a more objective measure of metaphor
familiarity in the future (although the details of such a method are left for future work).
With regard to aptness, we find that subjective ratings of the construct (as gathered by Jones and Estes, 2006,
for example) are sensitive to aspects of metaphors that go well beyond the imputed target dimension of aptness.
Specifically, they reflect the presence of salient inapplicable properties of the metaphor vehicle as well as
variation in metaphor processing fluency (i.e., by “in vitro conventionalization”). While the processing fluency
of a metaphor will likely be impacted by true aptness, it will likely also be impacted by conventionality, the
salience of inapplicable features, and other contextual factors, which could include perceived ease of structure
mapping. For example, Glucksberg and Haught (2006a) found that aptness ratings were increased for a novel
metaphor when an adjective was added that was literally true of the topic (e.g., A billboard is an advertising
wart.). However the inclusion of such adjectives also delayed comprehension times by about a second,
suggesting that a more extended process of dynamic category formation may have contributed to a more
satisfying ultimate alignment.
Finally, we have also found that subjective ratings of aptness are correlated with corpus frequency (i.e.,
arguably the most direct and objective measure of conventionality), which suggests that part of the reason for
the high correlation between ratings of aptness and conventionality may be that raters mistakenly attribute a
metaphor’s familiarity to its aptness, rather than (or possibly in addition to) the other way around.
How do these findings help us answer the question – what makes one metaphor easier to understand than
another? We speculate that in order for a metaphor to be used conversationally it must be “good.” If the vehicle
does not have features that apply to the topic (i.e., it is not apt), then the metaphor will be uninterpretable, and is
unlikely to be good. If it has some features that apply, but other salient features that do not, the metaphor may
be confusing and lead to failures in communication. This would tend to make the metaphor seem less good.
Therefore, we propose that aptness is normally a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a metaphor to gain
traction in natural language. Specifically, there may be some quality threshold that metaphoric sentences must
meet in order to become meaningful and prevalent in natural discourse. Arguments from “aptness” however,
risk being tautological rather than explanatory. If aptness ratings are really measuring perceived metaphor
quality, then aptness ratings are not explanatory of that quality, but only indicative of it.
Among metaphors that meet this aptness threshold, it seems to us that conventionalization certainly plays a
role in determining the speed and ease of metaphor processing. And data from experiments that employ the “in
vitro conventionalization” paradigm (e.g., Experiment 2 of this paper as well as Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) bear
this out. Thus, our findings may well support the career of metaphor hypothesis – the notion that in
comprehending novel metaphors, an interpretation emerges from comparison of the topic and vehicle. However,
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over time, as metaphoric mappings become
familiarized, we rely less on the mapping process
and more on established figurative meanings of
metaphor vehicles. That the power of metaphoric
communication resides in their generativity rather
than merely their aptness is supported by evidence
that metaphoric mappings of even conventional
metaphors are alive (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008).

Table 1. Central Theoretical Observations and Considerations
Conventionality Measures
Cannot be reliably defined for vehicles independent of topics.
Could be defined by more objective corpus analysis of sentences.
Aptness Ratings
Are correlated with corpus frequency (i.e., conventionality).
Are strongly influenced by salient features of metaphor vehicles
that fail to map onto the specific topic (contrary to standard
definitions of aptness).
Are influenced by manipulations of processing fluency (i.e.,
priming), and thus may not be explanatory of processing fluency
(comprehension time).
Conventionalization and Aptness Manipulations
Conventionalization may normally occur only for metaphors that
are (categorically) apt.

Conclusions
A summary of our chief theoretical results is
shown in Table 1. In our experiments we have
shown that conventionalizing (priming) an
appropriately-used metaphor increases its speed of
comprehension whereas priming an alternative
sense of the metaphor decreases its rated aptness. More generally we have shown that ratings of aptness are
sensitive to the presence of salient features that do not apply to the topic. Ratings of aptness thus do not capture
the theoretical explanatory construct (aptness) they are meant to measure. For these reasons rated aptness may
often be a measure of processing fluency rather than a predictor of it. Thus recent claims that aptness-ratings
explain metaphor processing fluency require re-evaluation.
In addition, we have argued that the conventionality of a metaphor must be considered in light of the meaning
that the metaphor vehicle instantiates: Seemingly conventional metaphors can be rendered hard to interpret by
ill-use. Aptness ratings can provide a heuristic evaluation of metaphor-sentence quality, but insofar as aptness
ratings are actually measures of perceived processing fluency, they are irrelevant to the evaluation of “aptness”
as an explanatory construct. In some cases they may even turn out to be measuring the conventionality of a
specific metaphoric sense (e.g., the weak sense in which a robin might turn out to be describable as an alarm
clock).
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Appendix: Stimulus lists

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Target
A business is a
living organism.
A fisherman is a
spider.
Beavers are
lumberjacks.
Some bladders are
barrels.
Insults are razors.
Cocaine is a time
bomb.
Education is a
lantern.
Her ex-husband is
a gem.
My computer
skills course is a
joke.

Same Sense (1)
A country fair is a
living organism.
A sharpshooter is a
spider.
A termite is a
lumberjack.
Some mugs are
barrels.
Rumors are razors.
Speeding is a time
bomb.
A documentary is a
lantern.
A great job is a gem.

Same Sense (2)
A super computer is a
living organism.
An assassin is a spider.

My cooking ability is a
joke.

My golf stroke is a
joke.

His college class is
a zoo.
The driveway is an
ice rink.
Having summers
off was a bear.
A lie is a dagger.

The airport is a zoo.

The mall is a zoo.

The marble floor is an
ice rink.
Flying back from
China was a bear.
Cold water is a dagger.

The good news
was an earthquake.
A zoo is a
museum.
That criminal’s
pathway is a
portrait.
Some teachers are
encyclopedias.

Victory was an
earthquake.
A library is a museum.

The dance floor is an
ice rink.
Doing homework is a
bear.
Breaking up is a
dagger.
Graduation was an
earthquake.
A botanical garden is a
museum.
A graph is a portrait.

My boyfriend is a
peach.
Jalapeno peppers
are fire.
Hostility is a veil.
Music can be
medicine.
That football
player is a rail.
Alcohol is a
crutch.
Control is fertilizer
A tree is an
umbrella.

That math theorem is a
portrait.

A woodpecker is a
lumberjack.
Some stomachs are
barrels.
Prejudice is a razor.
Cheating is a time
bomb.
A mentor is a lantern.
A sibling is a gem.

Some game show
contestants are
encyclopedias.
My uncle is a peach.

Some grandparents are
encyclopedias.

Taco sauce is fire.

Curry is fire.

Love is a veil.
Poetry can be
medicine.
That power lifter is a
rail.
Drugs are a crutch.

An envelope is a veil.
Exercise can be
medicine.
That boxer is a rail.

Love is fertilizer.
A roof is an umbrella.

Discipline is fertilizer.
A helmet is an
umbrella.
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My kitten is a peach.

Plagiarism is a crutch.

Metaphor Aptness and Conventionality 15

26

Some snores are
sirens.
That receptionist is
a breath of fresh
air.
An opponent is an
anchor.
His marriage was a
short leash.
The basketball
player was
thunder.
The Great Plains
are a board.
Some tears are
magnets.
My young cousin
is a shrimp.
Grandparents can
be donkeys.
Some fashion
models are twigs.
That professor is a
duck.
Some dogs are
princesses.

Some whistles are
sirens.
That candidate is a
breath of fresh air.

Some applause is a
siren.
The glass of water is a
breath of fresh air.

A friend is an anchor.

A goal is an anchor.

Daily chores are a
short leash.
That racehorse was
thunder.

A two year old is a
short leash.
That punch was
thunder.

The Sahara Desert is a
board.
Some lights are
magnets.
My Chihuahua is a
shrimp.
Bureaucrats can be
donkeys.
Some greyhounds are
twigs.
That clown is a duck.

Calm seas are a board.

38

My rat’s fur is silk.

39

Books are treasure
chests.
Many teams are
jails.
Time is money.
The nearest star is
a ball.
Ideas can be
diamonds.
Sadness is a
volcano.
The senator is a
fossil.
My grandfather’s
legs are steel.
That bedroom is a
dump.
Intelligence is a
warehouse.

A baby's bottom is
silk.
A good doctor is a
treasure chest.
Some families are
jails.
Work is money.
An orange is a ball.

Some screams are
magnets.
My hamster is a
shrimp.
Lobbyists can be
donkeys.
Some marathoners are
twigs.
That comedian is a
duck.
Some professional
tennis players are
princesses.
A bird's feathers are
silk.
A big brother is a
treasure chest.
Some high schools are
jails.
Sleep is money.
A globe is a ball.

Paintings can be
diamonds.
Anger is a volcano.

Houses can be
diamonds.
Joy is a volcano.

A barber is a fossil.

A judge is a fossil.

A rugby player's neck
is steel.
That dorm room is a
dump.
An external hard drive
is a warehouse.

A bouncer's arm is
steel.
That minivan is a
dump.
A garage is a
warehouse.

27

28
29
30

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Some cheerleaders are
princesses.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Literal Sense (1)
A mouse is a living
organism.
A black widow is a
spider.
Paul Bunyan is a
lumberjack.
Some casks are
barrels.
Shavers are razors.
Land mines are time
bombs.
A camp light is a
lantern.
A sapphire is a gem.
A knock-knock
riddle is a joke.
The place to see
lions is a zoo.
A hockey arena is
an ice rink.
The grizzly animal
was a bear.
A short knife is a
dagger.
Shaking the house
was an earthquake.
The Smithsonian
Institute is a
museum.
A picture of one's
self is a portrait.
Wikipedia is an
encyclopedia.
This fruit is a peach.
The blue flame is
fire.
A black cloth is a
veil.
Tylenol is medicine.
Trains travel on a
rail.
A cane is a crutch.
Manure is fertilizer.
A waterproof tarp is
an umbrella.
Some horns are
sirens.
A deep sigh is a

16

Literal Sense (2)
A tree is a living
organism.
A tarantula is a spider.
A logger is a
lumberjack.
Some wooden
containers are barrels.
Scalpels are razors.
Grenades are time
bombs.
A torch is a lantern.

Alternative Sense (1)
Friendship is a living
organism.
A basket weaver is a
spider.
A soldier is a lumberjack.

Alternative Sense (2)
Romance is a living
organism.
A seamstress is a spider.

A flag is a lantern.

A gladiator is a
lumberjack.
Some sumo wrestlers are
barrels.
Memories are razors.
Propaganda is a time
bomb.
A uniform is a lantern.

A lake surface is a gem.
Writing on his face while
he is asleep is a joke.
An art gallery is a zoo.

A full moon is a gem.
A Whoopi cushion is a
joke.
A jewelry show is a zoo.

The north pole is an ice
rink.
This case of books is a
bear.
A pistol is a dagger.

A walk in freezer is an ice
rink.
This solid oak desk is a
bear.
A fist is a dagger.

My parents’ divorce was
an earthquake.
My grandmother's jewelry
box is a museum.

The stock market crash
was an earthquake.
A time capsule is a
museum.

A president's picture is
a portrait.
This journal set is an
encyclopedia.
This candy flavor is
peach.
The light in the
distance is fire.
A mask is a veil.

A skyline is a portrait.

A sunset is a portrait.

Some phone books are
encyclopedias.
His cheek is a peach.

Some textbooks are
encyclopedias.
This blanket is a peach.

Coffee is fire.

Fresh pizza is fire.

A tissue is a veil.

An undershirt is a veil.

Marijuana can be
medicine.
This strip of metal is a
rail.
A wooden brace is a
crutch.
Nitrogen is fertilizer.
A parasol is an
umbrella.
Some alarms are
sirens.
A yawn is a breath of

Cherry candy can be
medicine.
That swimsuit model is a
rail.
A column is a crutch.

Chalky milkshakes can be
medicine.
That runner is a rail.

A ruby is a gem.
A prank is a joke.
A great field trip
destination is the zoo.
A frozen pond is an
ice rink.
The large predator was
a bear.
A small bladed
weapon is a dagger.
The shifting ground
was an earthquake.
An art gallery is a
museum.
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Santa Claus is a barrel.
Minds are razors.
Blackmail is a time bomb.

Broccoli is fertilizer.
Plastic is an umbrella.
The announcement is a
siren.
Graduation is a breath of

A wide bookshelf is a
crutch.
Sleep is fertilizer.
Gore-tex is an umbrella.
The news release is a siren.
The election is a breath of
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28
29
30
31
32

33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

breath of fresh air.
A large iron weight
is an anchor.
A dog collar is a
short leash.
That loud noise was
thunder.
A wooden plank is a
board.
Some refrigerator
decorations are
magnets.
A small sea creature
is a shrimp.
One farm animal is
a donkey.
A small tree branch
is a twig.
That quacking
animal is a duck.
The daughter of the
queen is a princess.
A soft delicate
fabric is silk.
Pirate booty is a
treasure chest.
A detention center is
a jail.
A dime is money.

fresh air.
A sinker is an anchor.

fresh air.
A broken leg is an anchor.

fresh air.
Debt is an anchor.

A restraining rope is a
short leash.
The sound of
lightening is thunder.
A table is a board.

A ponytail is a short
leash.
A crowd's cheer is
thunder.
A dead body is a board.

A sweatshirt hood is a
short leash.
A lion's roar is thunder.

This iron strip is a
magnet.

Some tape is a magnet.

Some nails are magnets.

A small shellfish is a
shrimp.
One pack animal is a
donkey.
A tiny piece of wood
is a twig.
That mallard is a duck.

A swimmer is a shrimp.

A diver is a shrimp.

Cashiers can be donkeys.

Butchers can be donkeys.

Some stale biscuits are
twigs.
Floating trash is a duck.

Some eggshells are twigs.

Some fairy tale
heroines are
princesses.
A Chinese fabric is
silk.
A gold coin container
is a treasure chest.
A penitentiary is a jail.

Some ice skaters are
princesses.

Some ballet dancers are
princesses.

A computer screen is silk.

A balk head is silk.

Safe deposit box

Vaults are treasure chests.

A $2000 fine is jail.

A spanking is jail.

A euro is money.

A class president is
money.
This party is a ball.
Shin guards are diamonds.

Tom Brady is money.

A chimney is a volcano.

The Marlboro man is a
volcano.
Beef jerky is a fossil.

A sphere is a ball.
Engagement rings
are diamonds.
Mt. Vesuvius is a
volcano.
Petrified wood is a
fossil.
Silverware is steel.

This dog toy is a ball.
Expensive jewels are
diamonds.
Pompeii is a volcano.

A landfill is a dump.
A post office is a
warehouse.

A junkyard is a dump.
A factory is a
warehouse.

A dinosaur bone is a
fossil.
A girder is steel.

In press (2011), Metaphor and Symbol

A stale twinkie is a fossil.
Some facial expressions
are steel.
A toilet is a dump.
That gym is a warehouse.

Arthritic joints are a board.

Tugboats are ducks.

Playing cards is a ball.
A cast is a diamond.

A meditating monk is steel.
A trashcan is a dump.
That office building is a
warehouse.

